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  Douglass North is a uniquely creative and inspiring social scientist. The impact of 
North’s ideas in the area development cooperation can hardly be overstated. By stressing the 
role of institutions, this scholar has immensely influenced development thinking and practice, 
providing intellectual underpinnings to the dominant good governance paradigm. North’s 
landmark Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance is one of the most cited books 
in the social sciences. This paper contends, however, that North’s ideas are widely cited, but 
not always properly understood. Moreover, some of his core arguments have been overlooked, 
ignored, or misrepresented, not least by the aid community. This paper provides a systematic 
assessment of the content and evolution of North’s writings, from his pioneering works on 
property rights and institutions in the 1970s, to his recent scholarship on beliefs and political 
violence. The focus is on identifying the key analytical problems and remaining challenges of the 
institutional approach to development. The paper also takes issue with the inconsistencies and 
policy gaps of the good governance consensus. In doing so, it also reflects upon the future of the 
research program on institutions and development. Would the renewed emphasis on politics, 
conflict, inequality, and context lead to an improved governance agenda or to a shift towards a 
post-institutionalist paradigm? 
  résumé
Douglass North est un sociologue éminemment créatif et passionnant. L’impact 
de ses idées dans le domaine de la coopération au développement est sans pareil. En mettant 
l’accent sur le rôle des institutions, ce chercheur a considérablement influencé la pensée et 
les pratiques relatives au développement, et il a jeté les bases intellectuelles du paradigme 
de la bonne gouvernance, actuellement dominant. Le livre-événement de North, Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance, est l’un des livres les plus cités en sciences sociales. 
Cependant, le présent texte soutient que les idées de North sont abondamment citées, mais 
pas toujours comprises correctement. En outre, certains de ses principaux arguments ont été 
négligés, ignorés ou déformés, en particulier par la communauté humanitaire. Le présent texte 
propose une évaluation systématique du contenu et de l’évolution des écrits de North, de ses 
œuvres pionnières des années 1970 sur les droits de propriété et les institutions à ses travaux de 
recherche récents sur les croyances et la violence politique. Nous insistons sur l’identification des 
problèmes analytiques cruciaux et des défis qui restent à relever dans l’approche institutionnelle 
du développement. Ce texte aborde également les incohérences théoriques et les failles dans la 
mise en œuvre du consensus sur la bonne gouvernance. Ce faisant, il développe également une 
réflexion sur l’avenir du programme de recherche sur les institutions et le développement. Le fait 
de mettre à nouveau l’accent sur la politique, les conflits, les inégalités et les contextes pourra-
t-il améliorer l’agenda de gouvernance ou entraînera-t-il un glissement vers un paradigme post-
institutionnaliste ?6 • IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01  Revisiting Douglass noRth Revisiting Douglass noRth  IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01 • 7 
1.  IntroduCtIon
‘If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants’ (Newton, 1675-6)
‘Virtually every major development strategy of the last 50 years is associated with some pioneering research 
that provided its intellectual underpinnings’ (Rodrik, 2010: 33)
Douglass North is one of the most creative and influential contemporary social  
scientists. The 1993 Nobel Prize for Economics is a unique thinker. Remarkably for an economist, 
his major works do not include formal assumptions and hypotheses, mathematical models, and 
quantitative tests.1 Yet they are full of novel and inspiring ideas. Indeed, his ability to ask new 
questions, develop original insights, walk across disciplinary boundaries, and move forward 
the research frontier is second to none. North’s ideas have had a massive influence in both 
economics and political science, contributing to the birth of the new economic history (Myhrman 
and Weingast, 1994), the rise of new institutional economics (Menard and Shirley, 2005), the 
reemergence  of  political  economy  (Ordeshook,  1990;  Banks  and  Hanushek,  1995),  and  the 
economic turn in comparative politics (Levi, 2000).2 By stressing the role of institutions, North 
has also made a substantive and lasting contribution to development studies. This scholar, 
together with Mancur Olson (1996), has provided the intellectual underpinnings of the dominant 
good governance agenda (Knack, 2003). 
North’s landmark Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance is one 
of the most cited books in the social sciences. As of 18 October 2011, this book has more than 
twenty thousand Google Scholar citations (20,887). This astonishing figure speaks volumes 
about the diffusion of North’s ideas. North’s classic text has been more cited than other seminal 
works in the new institutional economics, including Ronald Coase’s ‘The Nature of the Firm’ 
(18,506), Oliver Williamson’s ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ (16,019), and Elinor Ostrom’s Governing 
the Commons (9,953). It has been also consistently more cited than other classic works such as 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (11,201), Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (2,529), Keynes’s 
General Theory (14,926), Weber’s The Protestant Ethic (12,043), and Schumpeter’s Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy (14,950). In addition, North’s Institutions has attracted more attention 
than other popular contemporary works such as Downs’s Economic Theory of Democracy (16,420), 
Gramsci’s Prison’s Notebooks (10,980), Dahl’s Preface to Democratic Theory (2,775), Putman’s Making 
Democracy Work (15,507), Giddens’ Modernity and Self-Identity (15,706), and Sen’s Development as 
Freedom (11,788). Only books such as Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action (20,498), Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (19,720), and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (23,960) 
are in North’s league. We are confident that any alternative citation analysis would confirm the 
wide diffusion of North’s insights about institutions across the social sciences in general and 
development studies in particular.
The central contention of this article is, however, that North’s ideas have been 
widely cited, but not always properly understood. In a recent review of the contributions of 
Douglass North to the new institutional economics, Claude Menard and Mary Shirley (2010: 21)   
suggested that in the process of acceptance and adaptation of Northean institutional analysis 
[1]  This statement does not apply to his early writings on American and European history, which indeed involved 
the application of economic models and methodologies to the study of economic history. See, for example, North’s 
(1968) highly original account of productivity changes in ocean shipping. 
[2]  North’s ideas have also impacted on anthropology, sociology, public policy, management (notably in the sub-
field of industrial organization), and law (notably in the subfield of law and economics).
some of North’s core tenants have been ‘ignored, distorted, or misrepresented’, most notably by 
the aid community. This may be an example of a broader pattern. As Dani Rodrik (2010) argued, 
every major development strategies in the last decades have been associated with some pivotal 
intellectual development, including the contemporary emphasis on improved governance, 
which has been heavily grounded in North’s seminal works on institutions. But Rodrik also 
argued that there is always a significant gap between the original ideas of the founding fathers, 
on the one hand, and the caricaturized versions of them proposed by applied economists and 
policy advisors, on the other.3 In Rodrik’s (2010: 35, emphasis added) words: 
“The original researchers who instigated each of these strategies were themselves quite aware…of the nuances 
of their arguments and the specificities of their policy proposals. The bigger surprise is that there is often only a 
tenuous relationship between these works and the caricaturized message for which they often stand as a short 
cut reference”.
In order to bridge the gap between North’s original ideas and its caricaturized 
version, this essay provides a critical assessment of both the content and trajectory of the 
Northean approach to economic development. The proposition that institutions, understood as 
the rules of the game constraining human interaction, do matter is often taken as uncontroversial.  
Yet the ‘institutions rule’ thesis should not be taken at face value. A closer inspection of North’s 
writings reveals that the conceptualization of institutions, let alone its operationalisation and 
measurement, is more contested than commonly assumed. The relationship between institutions 
and  outcomes  is  also  problematic  given  the  pervasive  influence  of  informal  constraints, 
imperfect enforcement and subjective mental models. In addition, the two main claims of new 
institutionalism (that institutions do matter and that institutions are endogenous) are difficult 
to reconcile (Przeworski, 2004). Moreover, we still lack a proper understanding of how the 
good institutions that would foster development emerge and evolve over time (Mantzavinos, 
2001; Eggertsson, 2005). In light of these uncertainties, the policy lessons of neo-institutional 
economics are not obvious. As North himself recognizes in various works, institutional reforms 
do not always lead to better development outcomes; on the contrary, transplanting institutions 
can be a recipe for disaster (North, 2005).
Since the times of Adam Smith, political economists have sought to make sense 
of the overwhelming diversity in nations’ economic fortunes. Despite some advances, there is 
still much we don’t know about the ‘mystery of economic growth’ (Helpman, 2004). Why are 
some countries rich and others poor? What explains the huge variations in long-term economic 
performance across countries and within countries through time? Why have some countries 
managed to grow rapidly in the postwar era while others stagnated or shrunk? In the last 
decades, scholars have built upon the ideas of Douglass North to answer these ever-important 
questions. 
To some extent, this research program has been successful. North has given scholars 
useful analytical tools for uncovering some of the institutional and political sources of poverty 
and prosperity. However, new institutional economics still confronts serious challenges. By 
systematically analyzing the evolution of North’s thinking, this article points out the analytical, 
methodological and policy gaps of the institutional approach to development. In doing so, it 
offers a more nuanced account of the institutional and political underpinnings of peace and 
[3]  On the interesting but problematic relationship between academic research, development doctrine and actual 
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prosperity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section two outlines the evolution of North’s 
ideas, from his pioneering writings on economic history to its recent collaborative research on 
violence. In section three we stress the key analytical lessons of the Northean approach that 
often remain unaccounted for. Section four focuses on empirical and methodological issues. 
The following section discusses some policy implications in relation to the dominant good 
governance paradigm. We conclude by reflecting on the future of the research program on 
institutions and development. 
2.  the evolutIon of north’s IdeAs: A tour de forCe
‘Doug is a walking, talking, Kuhnian scientific revolution’ (Wallis, 2010)
  North’s intellectual trajectory has been motivated by one of the oldest but elusive 
research questions in political economy: What accounts for the significant variation in countries’ 
performance characteristics, both cross-section and over time? In particular, North has sought 
to understand the process of economic change, including the persistence of highly divergent 
development and institutional paths.
 In  The Rise of the Western World (co-authored with Robert Thomas), published in 
1973, North provided a new theoretical framework for understanding the sources of long-term 
economic prosperity and stagnation.4 The central claim of this ‘new economic history’ was that 
institutions were the fundamental determinant of economic success and divergent development 
paths. The bulk of North and Thomas’ explanation was based on the way ‘relative price changes’ 
create opportunities for the development of ‘efficient’ institutions. Breaking with traditional 
modes of analysis, the focus was not on objective conditions or factor endowments, but on rulers’ 
incentives. In some countries (notably Britain and the Netherlands), a particular configuration 
of relative prices created incentives for the development of productivity-enhancing activities, 
paving the way to commercial and industrial revolutions. In other places (notably Spain and 
to some extent France), both rulers and organizations faced incentives for engaging in rent-
seeking activities and patrimonial politics, facilitating the evolution of productivity-unfriendly 
policies and institutions. 
 In  Structure and Change in Economic History, published in 1981, North articulated a 
new way of thinking about economic and political development. By explicitly rejecting some of 
the neo-classical assumptions underpinning the study of economic history, he contended that 
economic performance through time is largely explained by variations in society’s ‘institutional 
frameworks’. Economics is a theory of choice; yet, people’s choice sets are constrained by the 
framework of political and economic institutions. In particular, the structure of property rights, 
together with the set of constitutional rules enforcing such structure, 
“Spell out the system of incentives and disincentives that guide and shape economic activity…and they 
also determine the underlying distribution of wealth and income of a society” (North, 1981: 17).
  In  Structure and Change, North was particularly concerned about the logic of 
institutional change and the persistence of ‘inefficient institutions’. The sources of institutional 
change, North contended, were economic as well as political. In principle, changes in relative 
prices should induce institutional change at the margin as societies innovate to reduce transaction 
costs in human interaction. But this does not occur automatically and instantaneously. 
Institutional change is an intensely political process. For one thing, some elites (notably rulers) 
play a key role in the game of institutional selection, as they enjoy a comparative advantage in 
overcoming collective-action problems. 
[4]  Previously, North had focused on American economic history. These early works included The Economic Growth 
of the Unites States 1790-1860 (North, 1961), Growth and Welfare in the American Past. A New Economic History (North, 
1966), and Institutional Change and American Economic Growth (Davis and North, 1971). His early writings also included 
a number of groundbreaking essays on institutions and economic history (North, 1965, 1971). For excellent reviews of 
these early writings, see Menard and Shirley (2010) and Wallis (2010).10 • IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01  Revisiting Douglass noRth Revisiting Douglass noRth  IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01 • 11 
For another, institutions create vested interests, which then prevent prospective changes in the 
status quo. In addition, the legitimacy of alternative institutional structures is also a function of 
the prevailing ideologies, understood as the competing rationalizations of the world around us. 
  In 1990, North published Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
clearly his most influential book. Like in Structure and Change, North continued arguing that 
institutions fundamentally affect economic performance by structuring incentives. Yet this work 
offered a more thorough analysis of (1) the concept of institutions, (2) the channels through 
which institutions shape outcomes, and (3) the way institutions themselves change over time as 
a response to alterations in the political economy environment. North (1990: 3) famously defined 
institutions as ‘the rules of the game, or more formally the humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction’. But he also stressed that the real incentive structure of a society is 
made up of ‘formal institutions’ (constitutions, property rights), ‘informal constraints’ (social 
norms and conventions, codes of conduct) and ‘enforcement characteristics’. In addition, he 
crucially contended that people make choices on the basis of ‘subjective mental models’ that do 
not tend to converge over time. 
  In this book, North was also interested in accounting for ‘the survival of economies 
with  persistently  poor  performance  over  long  periods  of  time’  (North,  1990:  92).  His  story 
revolved around path dependency. In the context of increasing returns and high transaction costs, 
institutional pathways are self-reinforcing. Inefficient institutions create organizations and 
interest groups with a stake in the existing (inefficient) constraints. In addition, ‘the subjective 
mental constructs of the players will evolve an ideology that not only rationalizes the society’s 
structure but accounts for its poor performance’ (North, 1990: 99).  Path dependency explains 
why similar changes in relative prices may lead to dissimilar outcomes in different societies. 
It also explains why is so difficult to change institutions. Yet the notion of path dependence 
is often misused and abused. This concept should not be understood in a ‘deterministic’ way 
(North, 2005). Societies can break, and indeed have broken, with path dependency. However, 
history suggests that, once countries are in a given track, institutional structures are resilient 
and development paths very difficult to reverse.
Understanding the Process of Economic Change, published in 2005, was an extension, a ‘very 
substantial extension’ in North’s own words, of new institutional economics. In this book, 
North continued to be concerned about the way institutions shape economic performance by 
structuring incentives. However, the central aim of Understanding the Process was to explain how 
different societies arrive at the institutional infrastructure that then greatly determines their 
economic trajectories. North’s new analysis of how institutions evolve and how economies 
change through time was strongly cognitive. According to North (2005: 5):
“Beliefs and the way they evolve are at the heart of the theoretical issues of this book…Economic change 
is for the most part a deliberate process shaped by the perceptions of the actors about the consequences 
of their actions.” 
  It  is  worth  underlining  that  in  Understanding  the  Process  ‘shared  beliefs’  (or 
mental models according to North’s earlier formulation) attained causal significance. Drawing 
lessons from anthropology and cognitive science, North (2005) highlighted that the institutional 
structure reflects the accumulated beliefs of the society over time.5 Economic development 
involves people making ‘intentional’ choices in the context of institutional incentives. Yet the 
issue is that ‘we choose among alternatives that are themselves a construction of the human 
mind…individuals from different backgrounds will interpret the same evidence differently and 
in consequence make different choices’ (North, 2005: 11-62). This cognitive mechanism plays 
a crucial role in the context of the pervasive uncertainty that dominates social interaction. In 
particular, causal beliefs regarding how the economic system works and how it should work 
affect both economic performance and institutional development. According to North (2005), 
beliefs are also a key source of path dependence; they constrain the choice set of the actors by 
defining the range of perceived legitimate change.  
  The publication of Violence and Social Orders in 2009 marked a new milestone in 
Douglass  North’s  already  impressive  scholarship.  This  thought-provoking  book,  by  North 
and his colleagues John Wallis and Barry Weingast, has opened an ambitious agenda aimed 
at integrating the systematic study of violence into the political economy of development. 
As a starting point, these scholars challenged the Weberian assumption that the state has a 
monopoly in the legitimate use of violence. If anything, all societies have to deal with either 
violence or the threat of it. Moreover, violence should be politically contained and managed. 
This stresses the importance of studying the institutions that emerge to control violence and 
its implications for economic and political development. In essence, Violence and Social Orders 
articulated the underlying logic of two alternative patterns of social organization and explained 
how societies make the transition from one social order to the other.
  The alternative models of social organization are natural (or limited access) states, 
on the one hand, and open access societies, on the other. Natural states reduce the problem 
of endemic violence by granting special privileges (rents) to certain elites, but at the cost of 
penalizing political and economic development. In open access societies, violence is controlled 
through the state in the context of an institutional framework that favors credible commitments 
towards limiting the use of violence and maintaining open political and economic markets.  
An  open  access  society  is  the  key  condition  for  both  economic  and  political  development. 
Unfortunately, the features of open access societies have been the exception rather than the 
norm.6  From the point of view of development, “the big question is how natural states make the 
transition to open access societies” (North et al., 2009: 25). Violence and Social Orders made some 
ground in specifying the conditions under which elites transform their personal privileges into 
impersonal rights. The so-called ‘doorstep conditions’ of economic development include: (1) rule 
of law for elites, (2) perpetually lived forms of public and private elite organizations, including 
the state itself, and (3) consolidated political control of the military.  
  There has been a great deal of continuity in North’s writings. This scholar has 
developed  a  conceptual  framework  for  understanding  economic  change  over  time.  North 
has consistently claimed that institutions (property rights and contract enforcement) affect 
economic performance by setting incentives. He has also argued that ‘credible commitment’ is 
[5]  On the fundamental role of beliefs, see also Denzau and North (1994), Knight and North (1997), and North 
(1999).
[6]  North et al (2009) shows that the default social outcome is the natural state; around 175 countries and up to 
85% of the world’s population still live in limited access orders.12 • IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01  Revisiting Douglass noRth Revisiting Douglass noRth  IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01 • 13 
the fundamental problem of developing societies (North, 1993). Institutions emerge to reduce 
uncertainty and transactions costs in the transition from personal to impersonal exchange. The 
key analytical conundrum North confronted was that of integrating an analysis of institutional 
roles with a theory of institutional change. In an early essay, he claimed that economics 
should integrate an explanation of the formation, mutation and development of institutional 
arrangements (North, 1971). Forty years later, we face the very same challenge. The attempt 
to marry theories of institutional effects and institutional evolution is both the strength and 
Achilles’ heel of the Northean approach to development. 
  However, there has been also a significant evolution in North’s ideas. This learning 
has been shaped by conscious rethinking based on the observation of reality, including the 
evident and uncomfortable policy gaps of the institutions for development agenda. Despite 
theoretical advances in institutional theory, the reality of developing countries shows that 
underdevelopment paths are highly resilient and institutional fixes undermined by unintended 
consequences. In this context, the evolution of North’s writings reflects an increasing concern with 
the cognitive and political sources of imperfect institutions. Achieving economic development is 
not only about setting the right prices by transplanting best-practices economic institutions. It 
is fundamentally about the political and social orders supporting effective economic governance. 
North has also moved beyond property rights, emphasizing that a range of formal and informal 
institutional arrangements should emerge to support credible commitments and growth.
  All in all, North’s intellectual journey, observed in the richness and complexity of 
his scholarship, has been a tour de force. He initially made a contribution to economic history 
by stressing the role of transaction costs, property rights and institutions. But over time his 
institutional approach became more political and, significantly, more cognitive. Institutional 
change is intensely political because powerful elites have high stakes in the survival of the 
status quo. Culturally embedded beliefs are also fundamental determinants of both economic 
and institutional change, explaining the persistence of highly divergent development paths. In 
his latest works, North’s approach came full circle, as he sought to integrate growth, governance 
and conflict into a comprehensive political economy of development. Promoting development 
is not only about creating the conditions for economic growth; it is also about providing the 
sources of political stability and social control. In other words, it is about articulating the politics 
of accumulation and redistribution.
  North  has  been  always  eager  to  ask  novel  questions,  contest  established 
assumptions, propose new frames of thinking, and explore uncharted territories. As a true 
master, he has been also prepared to reconsider his own ideas along the way. As one review put 
it: 
“It is a remarkable fact that Douglass North is never satisfied with his previous work, however important it may 
have been. He always pushes forward for new insights” (Myhrman and Weingast, 1994: 192). 
3.  AnAlytICAl GAps of the InstItutIonAl ApproACh
‘Understanding is a necessary prerequisite missing in the economist’s rush to model economic growth and 
change’ (North, 2005: ix)
  The theoretical implications of North’s approach to development are less obvious 
and more complex than commonly assumed. The main thesis of new institutional economics 
is that institutions shape economic performance by structuring incentives. However, the way 
institutions and its likely effects are conceptualized in North’s writings remains contested. In 
addition, North emphasizes that imperfect enforcement and subjective mental models mediate 
the relationship between institutional incentives and outcomes. Finally, and perhaps more 
importantly, the very institutions that are meant to constrain behavior are human choices 
themselves, raising questions of causality and endogeneity. This section spells out the remaining 
analytical gaps of the institutional approach to development.7  
3.1  The Fundamental Problem of Development: Credible Commitment
  To begin with, it is worth stressing what economic development is about from 
a Northean perspective. Like most development economists, North is concerned with how 
societies increase productivity and realize gains from trade. But he contends that what’s missing 
from development economics is an understanding of the nature of human cooperation required 
to sustain impersonal exchange. A developed politico-economic system assumes a complex 
web of impersonal contracts across both space and time. The problem is that the existence of 
uncertainty and transaction costs undermines specialization and division of labor. If contracts 
are constantly violated, economic agents will neither realize gains from trade nor engage in 
wealth-maximizing activities. In this context, North (1990: 12) writes that ‘institutions matter 
precisely when transaction is costly’. Institutions emerge to reduce the ubiquitous uncertainty 
of human interaction. Governments’ inability to create and sustain credible commitments is the 
most fundamental binding constraint on economic and political development (North, 1993).8 
3.2.  The Elastic Meaning of Institutions
  Concept formation is one of the crucial challenges of new institutionalism. Although 
it is widely accepted that institutions matter because they place constrains on actors’ behavior, 
different neo-institutional schools still disagree on (1) the very definition of institutions, (2) the 
way institutions affect outcomes, and (3) how institutions emerge and evolve over time.9 Some 
of these uncertainties are reflected in North’s works. The conceptualization of institutions is a 
case in point. Unlike many political scientists, North does not merely focus on the formal rules 
of political economy games. He claims instead that the real ‘institutional matrix’ of a society is 
composed of formal institutions, informal constraints, and enforcement characteristics (North, 
1990). Moreover, he claims that elusive concepts such as dogmas, myths and prejudices might 
play institutional roles in different contexts. 
In the extreme, every patterned form of social interaction can become an institution (Calvert, 
[7]  These issues are discussed in more detail in Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2010).
[8]  The importance of credible commitment is also analyzed in North and Weingast’s (1989) classic work on Eng-
land’s Glorious Revolution. North (1997) discusses the contributions of new institutional economics to the study of 
third world development.
[9]  See, among others, Crawford and Ostrom (1995), Hall and Taylor (1996), Peters (1999), Thelen (1999), Matzavi-
nos (2001), and Weingast (2002).14 • IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01  Revisiting Douglass noRth Revisiting Douglass noRth  IOB Discussion Paper 2012-01 • 15 
1995). This conceptual ambiguity is the source of conceptual stretching and leads to serious 
problems regarding the choice of research and measurement strategies.  
3.3.  Too Much Institutionalism, Too Little Politics
  Problems of concept formation induce analytical stretching, a common problem in 
the new political of economy of growth. Scholars seeking to study the institutional foundations 
of economic growth typically focus on mechanisms such as political stability, bureaucratic 
efficiency,  corruption,  expropriation  risks,  policy  certainty,  social  polarization,  and  ethnic 
conflict (e.g. Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Alesina, 1998; Acemoglu et al. 2001). The 
issue is that these mechanisms do not refer to the rules of the game per se, but to the way the 
game is played in different societies. Indeed, as one critic put it, some scholars ‘tend to see 
institutions everywhere’ (Sangpman, 2007). If institutions simply become a proxy for ‘politics 
and society’, the concept loses its analytical value. Thus, we should distinguish between the 
institutional and the political embedded in the concept of governance. In a public conference, 
North acknowledged that institutions should refer to the rules of the game and governance to 
the way the game is played given those institutions (North, 2008). This critical distinction is 
largely overlooked in the good governance agenda.
3.4.  Beliefs, The Great Omission of Political Economy
  It  should  be  remarked  that  North’s  analytical  framework  is  not  only  about 
institutions; it is about institutions and beliefs. In his Nobel lecture, North highlighted that 
an ‘institutional/cognitive approach’ should be used to make sense of the economic past and 
present (North, 1994).10 This scholar deeply believes that conflicting beliefs are the source of most 
of the problems we confront, including poverty and violence (North, 2008). Yet he also believes 
that a proper understanding of the way beliefs and institutions interact is the biggest omission 
in political economy (North, 2006). A proper assessment of the role of beliefs and learning is 
also missing from the international development agenda. It seems that development experts 
are shying away from this task in order to evade the sensitive issue of cultural determinism. But 
this is not a case of cultural determinism. It is a case of how mental models constrain actors’ 
choices by affecting the range of acceptable actions. In other words, it is about comprehending 
the cultural and ideological roots of path dependence. 
3.5.  Sources of Cooperation: Beyond Property Rights
  Property rights and contract enforcement are undoubtedly important for economic 
development. Yet North’s lessons are more general. Institutions are basically solutions to 
problems of cooperation. And the transition from underdevelopment (personal exchange) to 
development (impersonal exchange) entails the solution of multiple cooperation and credible-
commitment problems, both in relation to accumulation and redistribution. A narrow focus on 
property rights has led scholars to underestimate the breadth of institutional arrangements 
needed to support the transition towards development, including the role of the state in 
[10]  Indeed, his sensitiveness to cognitive issues looms large. In his 1971 article, North argued that ‘people fre-
quently act in terms of general ideological positions’ (North,1971: 122). Let’s also remember that his 1981 book put 
emphasis on the ideological underpinnings of inefficient institutions.
facilitating public-private cooperation at early stages of industrialization (Bardhan, 2005; Lange 
and Rueschemeyer, 2005; Leftwich, 2008).11 Drawing lessons from China, North once stressed 
that there are different ways of setting up the right incentives. In his own words: 
“China is intriguing because it does not appear directly to do any of the right things…There are lots of 
different ways to achieve wealth. There are lots of different ways to structure the game, to provide the 
correct incentives (that is what institutions are, incentives structures) to do the right thing” (North, 1999: 
23; see also North, 2005).
3.6.  Endogenous and Distributive Institutions
  At the analytical level, the most pressing challenge of new institutionalism is 
reconciling the institutions-do-matter and the institutions-are-endogenous claims. If institutions 
are endogenously determined, they can hardly be the primary cause of economic development 
(Przeworski, 2004). This is not merely an issue of reversed causality: only rich countries can 
afford good institutions. The real issue is that the very institutions that constrain behavior are 
human choices themselves. North is fully aware of this. Moreover, he has consistently argued 
that institutions are not only endogenous, but also distributional. Institutions are not created 
to be socially efficient; they are chosen to ‘serve the interests of those with the bargaining 
power to create new rules’ (North, 1994).  So far the literature has largely paid attention to 
the effects of institutions, however conceptualized and measured, on economic performance. 
Much less effort has been dedicated to understanding the nuances of institutional origins and 
the dynamics of self-enforcing institutions (but see Greif, 2007). Despite evident advances in 
evolutionary economics (Aoki, 2010), we still need to develop better theories of institutional 
change (Eggertsson, 2005; Menard and Shirley, 2010).
[11]  The fascinating literature on the management of shared natural resources shows the diversity of institutional 
solutions to cooperation problems and hence the limits of narrow (private) property rights perspective. See, e.g. 
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4.  empIrICAl And methodoloGICAl Issues
  The neo-institutional revolution in the social sciences has led to the proliferation 
of studies seeking to document the empirical effects, and more recently, the determinants of 
institutions. Some progress has been clearly made. However, the methodological foundations of 
many of these empirical studies can be disputed. This section points out some methodological 
issues surrounding the empirical literature on institutions and development. 
4.1  Concept Formation and Measurement of Institutions
  As  Giovanni  Sartori  (1970)  argued,  concept  formation  should  be  the  first  step 
towards measurement. This wise lesson is often ignored in comparative institutional analysis. 
Although scholars typically start their studies by citing North’s famous definition of institutions, 
they then choose empirical strategies that are inconsistent with the Northean approach. 
Indeed, measurement is one of the most outstanding methodological gaps of the literature 
on institutions and development. On the one hand, we have experienced a revolution in the 
measurement of institutions (Knack, 2003). On the other hand, the indicators commonly used 
to substantiate the claim that institutions cause growth might be unsuitable for that purpose 
(Glaeser et al., 2004). Specifically, the standard practice of measuring institutions through 
outcome-variables is highly problematic. Perceived ratings of expropriation risk, bureaucratic 
efficiency, and corruption are not meant to capture institutions-as-constraints; they capture the 
way the game is played in different countries. Consequently, the observed association between 
rules and outcomes is often induced by the choice of flawed measurement strategies. This 
serious issue has not been properly addressed yet.12 
  Conceptual ambiguity also haunts the good governance agenda of development 
(Weiss, 2000). The conventional wisdom is that governance, broadly defined as the institutions 
and traditions that determine how authority is exercised in a country, matters to economic 
development (Kaufmann et al., 2000). The trouble is that governance and eventually good 
governance are commonly used as catch-all buzzwords that include almost everything, from 
the rule of law to bureaucratic efficiency, from corruption to expropriation risks, from property 
rights to political stability. This conceptual vagueness raises questions regarding the analytical 
and empirical merits of the governance agenda. 
  Another issue is that North attributes importance to formal institutions, but 
also to informal constraints and enforcement characteristics. He suggests moreover that the 
pervasiveness of informal rules and imperfect enforcement play a central role in developing 
countries. The good governance discourse seeks to accommodate this concern by loosely referring 
to countries’ ‘traditions’. This crucial point deserves a deeper and more rigorous discussion, both 
in relation to conceptualization and measurement. We also need more systematic research on 
the sources and effects of informal rules and enforcement mechanisms. As North et al. (2009: 
271) point out: 
[12]  Even committed institutionalists have been denouncing this practice. See, e.g., Menard and Shirley (2010) and 
Wallis (2010). On the uses and abuses of governance indicators, see the comprehensive analysis of Arndt and Oman 
(2006) and the rich exchange between Kurtz and Schrank (2007) and Kaufmann et al. (2007).
“We still are some distance from a deeper comprehension of the interaction of formal rules, informal norms and 
enforcement characteristics that together determine the performance of the overall institutional framework”. 
4.2  Analytical Stretching 
  Conceptual and measurement flaws question the value of comparative research 
on  institutions.  Consider  an  important  work  on  the  political  economy  of  development: 
Feng’s (2003) Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance. Building explicitly on North’s 
analytical  framework,  Feng  finds  that  ‘political  institutions’  do  affect  economic  growth  by 
affecting individuals’ decisions in the marketplace. At first glance, these findings have a strong 
institutionalist flavor, suggesting that institutions cause development. Yet the real picture is 
more nuanced. Political institutions are operationalized in terms of political repression, political 
instability and policy uncertainty. Moreover, policy certainty, the main mechanism explaining 
the contrasting performances of East Asia and Latin America, is measured with inequality 
indicators. Feng’s broad concept of institutions is simply capturing the political environment 
of growth rather than pointing out to country’s specific institutional features. From a research 
design perspective, we face the problem of ‘same data, different conclusions’ (Przeworski, 2004). 
Is inequality or institutional decay the underlying factor explaining the divergent development 
paths of East Asia and Latin America?
  The following example may also illustrate the problem of conceptual stretching. In 
Democracy, Governance & Growth, Knack (2003) provided a list of countries showing negative 
growth of relative per capita income in the period 1960-1998. The list of ‘fall-back’ countries 
includes Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Equatorial 
Guinea, Angola, and Zambia. It is evident that ‘bad governance’ was a major factor hindering 
economic performance in those countries. However, to claim that poor institutional quality, 
reflected in bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption and insecure property rights, was the primary 
factor explaining those growth collapses stretches the analytical reach of new institutionalism. 
Most of the above-mentioned countries were facing deeply rooted political struggles, if not a 
state of latent civil war. As Easterly and Levine (1997) showed, ethnic conflict has been behind 
Africa’s governance and growth tragedies. In this context, there is a case for putting institutions 
in their place and taking distributional struggles more seriously. North’s recent scholarship on 
political order and violence is pointing in this direction.
4.3  Towards an Empirical Agenda on the Sources and Role of Beliefs
  Beliefs and human learning are a core component of the Northean institutional/
cognitive approach. Moreover, beliefs have acquired causal preeminence in North’s most 
recent writings, as he claimed: ‘where do the rules, informal norms, and for that matter the 
effectiveness of the enforcement, come from? They are derived from the beliefs human have’ 
(North, 2005: 48). This means that making sense of beliefs, how they change over time, and their 
relationship with institutions is crucial for understanding development.  However, despite some 
commendable but isolated efforts (notably Inglehart’s World Values Survey research program), 
the empirical analysis of culture is not a priority in the good governance discourse.13 
[13]  Fortunately, some scholars are moving away from conventional practices. For example, in an original paper 
Licht et al. (2007) examine the cultural foundations of different aspects of governance, including the rule of law, cor-
ruption, and democratic accountability. See also Tabellini’s (2010) study on the cultural roots of governance across 
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The development community is understandably cautious about stressing the cultural and 
ideological determinants of economic and political development. Yet the cognitive dimension of 
development needs to be taken out from the black box. 
  Building on Putman’s (1993) influential work on Italy, scholars have tried to fill 
this gap by looking at the role of ‘social capital’ (Lyon, 2000; Knack and Keefer, 2003). But the 
social capital for development agenda should be the starting point of a wider research effort. 
For example, in an original work, Reis and Moore (2005) assessed the patterns and implications 
of elite perceptions of poverty and inequality in places such as Brazil and Indonesia. This is the 
way forward: the influence of ideas on economic development should be systematically and 
thoroughly investigated. What’s missing, though, is an ambitious research program examining 
how prevailing beliefs constrain policy choices and institutional reform in different contexts. 
Research should also focus on how shared beliefs evolve as a response to new information and 
changes in the politico-economic environment. By emphasizing the role of conflicting ‘causal 
beliefs’ (i.e. mental mappings between actions, events and outcomes), North (2005) spells out 
the scope of this challenging but much-needed agenda.14
4.4  The Politics of Property Rights and Institutional Pathways
  Empirical studies on the institutional conditions of development should expand 
beyond property rights, looking at the range of institutional arrangements that are required 
to sustain political order and self-enforcing growth at early stages of development (Bardhan, 
2005). Campos and Root’s (1996) brilliant analysis of credible commitment in East Asia illustrates 
this point. This work documented the multiple institutional arrangements, both in relation to 
accumulation and redistribution, which emerged in some East Asian countries to secure the 
cooperation of elites and non-elites. Campos and Root’s groundbreaking work underlined the 
importance of examining the set of economic and political bargains supporting the credibility 
of institutional arrangements. The field is relatively short of empirical studies systematically 
analyzing how the state interacts with powerful interest groups. Sen and Te Velde (2009) 
pioneering research on state-business relationships in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates the 
added value of exploring this uncharted territory.15
  Moving beyond property rights assumes the existence of alternative institutional 
paths to success. As a result, cross-national studies on governance and development should 
be complemented with comparative case studies exploring intensively how local conditions, 
institutional development, and economic performance interact in different societies (Rodrik, 
2003). Scholars should also pay more attention to the unpleasant trade-offs associated with 
the idea of expanding and protecting private property rights. An established literature shows 
that economic freedom and secure property rights create incentives for capital accumulation 
and growth (Gwartney et al., 1999; Wu and Davis, 1999). Yet another line of research shows that 
inequality and social polarization hinder both good governance and growth (Keefer and Knack, 
2002). These two important areas of inquiry need to be integrated. 
[14]  Cognitive issues also shape donors’ behavior. For example, Gibson et al’s (2005) Samaritan’s Dilemma put the 
emphasis on incentives, but also on underlying cultural and learning processes.  
[15]  This research program is inspired by Robert Wade’s (1990) and Peter Evans’s (1995) classic works on East Asian 
developmental states.
4.5  Studying Self-Enforcing Institutions
  An empirical agenda on the institutional foundations of development should 
bridge accounts of institutional effects and endogenous institutions. Research on the potential 
benefits of certain institutions must include an analysis of the conditions under which those 
institutions are likely to emerge and be sustained in equilibrium. Evaluating the economic impact 
of institutions requires ‘examining them in the broader context of the factors influencing the 
extent to which the political system is self-enforcing’ (Greif, 1998: 60). This assumes a profound 
understanding of the political conditions underpinning credible commitment and self-enforcing 
growth. This should involve the study of both domestic and international conditions.  A scholarly 
literature in comparative politics and international relations suggests that international factors 
facilitate sustained growth, democratic governance and conflict resolution (Boix, 2002; Stubbs, 
2005). Knack’s (2003) list of ‘fall-back’ and ‘catch-up’ countries also points to the relevance of 
geopolitics. It is suggestive that all of the twenty-one countries with negative or slow growth 
are from Africa and Latin America. On the other hand, all the countries with strong growth, with 
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5.  polICy ImplICAtIons
‘The new institutional economics has made good progress in analyzing the role of institutions in shaping 
economic outcomes, but the field has made less headway formulating clear principles of institutional policy in 
many crucial areas (Eggertsson, 2005: 191) 
‘We know a lot about polities but not how to fix them’ (North, 2005: 67)
  Does the Northean perspective offer any lessons for development policy? 
Understanding the past, North argues, is ‘the key to improving the performance of economies 
in the present and future…a real understanding of how economies grow unlocks the door to 
greater human well-being and to a reduction in misery and abject poverty’ (North, 2005: 
vii).  However,  North  has  been  always  concerned  about  our  limited  ability  to  improve  the 
performance of developing countries by design (North, 2005: 67).  It is worth noting that, 
despite the consolidation of the good governance rhetoric in international development, 
the policy implications of North’s ideas are far from obvious. It is striking, for example, that 
while international financial institutions have been increasingly accepting the importance of 
institutional issues, critiques of development assistance have been also strongly influenced by 
North (Menard and Shirley, 2010: 18-19). This section sheds some light on this crucial issue.
5.1  The Policy Gap of the Good Governance Approach
  Plenty of intellectual, financial and political resources have been allocated in the 
last decades to improve the economies and polities of developing countries. Despite these 
efforts, the outcomes have not been always satisfactory (Easterly, 2002). Up to 85% of the world 
population is still living outside open access societies characterized by modern forms of economic 
and political organization (North et al., 2009). In many areas, the gap between development 
thinking and development practice remains hugely disappointing. We have made important 
inroads in understanding the economic and institutional foundations of development. We are 
also increasingly aware of the political and social conditions underpinning wealth-enhancing 
policies. Yet the problem is that ‘we do not know yet how to get there’ (North, 2008). 
  Both academic and policy research have highlighted that institutions play a major 
role in economic development. Yet the unpleasant reality is that we still live in a world of 
‘imperfect institutions’ (Eggertsson, 2005). Moreover, the sources of imperfect institutions are 
still elusive. Take the policy gap of the good governance agenda. Since the mid-1990s, global 
financial institutions (e.g. IMF, World Bank), governments’ development agencies (e.g. USAID, 
DFID) and international NGOs (e.g. Transparency International) have strongly advocated the 
good governance paradigm (Weiss, 2000).16 The principle of institutional conditionality has been 
also applied to improve the effectiveness of foreign aid in various regions, notably Africa. Some 
of the results have been dismal, though. North et al. (2009) documents that the so-called third-
wave of democratization relented in the last ten years. 
More tellingly, the intellectual fathers of World Bank’s Governance Indicators have suggested 
that the quality of governance in developing countries has not appeared to improve since the 
[16]  On the penetration of the Northean approach on the development agenda, see especially World Bank (2002) 
and International Monetary Fund (2003, 2005). The pivotal change in the development game took place in the late 
1990s, when the international community began to claim that good government was not a luxury, but a vital condi-
tion for development (World Bank, 1996; IMF, 1997).
emergence of the ‘governance matters’ discourse. Specifically, they claim that:  
“There is little evidence of significant (or quantitatively important) changes in world averages of governance 
over the past decade…this evidence highlights major governance challenges worldwide, where improvements 
in governance in some countries are largely offset by declines in others, with the result that world averages 
show little change” (Kaufmann et al., 2009a: 23-4).
  This policy anomaly has led to efforts aimed at rethinking governance (Kaufmann, 
2003; Grindle 2004). Some of these efforts are welcome: the recognition of the limits of a 
technocratic  account  of  corruption,  the  rejection  of  a  blanket  approach  to  best  practices, 
the increasing focus on context and local conditions, the rise of a more holistic and theory-
based approach to development evaluation, and the growing awareness of politics. Yet this 
reassessment of governance should be strengthened further. A good starting point is to revisit 
the analytical and policy implications of the Northean approach. Can we really promote economic 
development, improve polities, and accommodate social conflict through institutional design? 
Can we really remove the binding constraints on development by working around countries’ 
institutional frameworks? North has provided answers to these questions, but also warnings. 
Unfortunately, some of these warnings have been ignored. 
5.2  The Quandary of Transplanting Institutions
  Even though North has been always extremely cautious when it comes to deriving 
policy implications from his works, people continue to draw soft lessons from the institutions-
do-matter proposition. Institutions do indeed matter; yet the relationship between institutions 
and outcomes is problematic. For one thing, the effects of changing the formal rules of the game 
are highly uncertain in the context of pervasive informal constraints and imperfect enforcement. 
For another, institutional incentives are filtered through culturally derived, and often conflicting, 
mental models. As a result, the adoption of the same formal rules by different societies may 
induce highly divergent outcomes. North illustrates this point by stressing that many Latin 
American countries sought to replicate the American constitutional model in the nineteenth 
century, with diverging and mostly disappointing results (North, 2005; North et al., 2000).17 In 
his 1990 book, he clearly explains what happens when a common set of rules is imposed on two 
different societies: 
“Although the rules are the same, the enforcement mechanisms, the way enforcement occurs, the norms of 
behavior, the subjective mental models of the actors are not. Hence, both the real incentive structures and the 
perceived consequences of policies will differ as well. Thus, a common set of fundamental changes in relative 
prices or the common imposition of a set of rules will lead to widely divergent outcomes in societies with 
different institutional arrangements” (North, 1990: 101).18
  Although the lesson is obvious, it is worth repeating it. Transplanting institutions 
is not always a good solution; it can even be a recipe for disaster in the context of pervasive 
unintended consequences. As North argued in the Process of Economic Change: ‘the creation of 
a stable consensual polity takes time and simply putting in place the formal rules is a recipe 
for disappointment, not to say disaster’ (North, 2005: 161). It should be emphasized that 
institutional engineering is even more taxing in light of North’s most recent works.  In Violence 
and Social Orders, North and his colleagues explained that: ‘until societies are at least on the 
[17]  Putman’s (1993) account of Italy’s uneven democratic performance also illustrates the long-lasting influence of 
informal rules and cultural predispositions. 
[18]  Interestingly, in his 2005 book, North’s explanation became more culturally grounded, remarking that the 
source of the contrasting institutional patterns of the U.S. and Latin America was ‘the fundamental beliefs of the 
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doorstep of a transition to opening access, however, transplanting these institutions and 
policies cannot produce economic development in natural states…Worse, if these institutions 
undermine the political arrangements maintaining political stability, these new institutions 
may unleash disorder, making the society significantly worse’ (North et al., 2009: 264-5).19
5.3  Articulating Accumulation and Redistribution
  North’s concerns about political stability touch another crucial issue: the 
articulation of accumulation and distribution.20  Development  strategists  should  take  more 
seriously Karl Polany’s great insight: markets are a powerful force of sociopolitical change, but 
they are also a potential source of political conflict as societies seek to protect themselves from 
market forces (Polanyi, 2001). Leaders in developed countries are fully conscious of this tension 
(hence, the massive nationalization of banks in the context of the recent global economic 
meltdown). However, this lesson is often ignored in the world of development assistance.21 
The case of Bolivia, a country that made a swift transition from donor darling to basket case, 
vividly exemplifies this dilemma. In that country, an attempt to push market reforms beyond 
the limits of political feasibility led to a political backlash against the very property rights 
that the government wanted to enforce in the first place.22 It is intriguing that many studies 
documenting the importance of property rights, also stress the significance of political stability 
(e.g. Alesina, 1998). What is missing from those studies, though, is a rigorous assessment of 
the policy issues stemming from the competing aims of protecting property rights and securing 
political legitimacy and stability. 
5.4  Alternative Institutional Paths to Success
  North’s writings underscore that the consolidation of institutions such as property 
rights, democratic accountability and independent judicial systems have created the conditions 
for economic growth in the Western world. However, North has also argued that there is no 
single institutional path to economic success. Reflecting upon the unique experience of China, 
whose development path has defied conventional prescriptions, he remarked that ‘the key is 
the incentive structure that is created, not the slavish imitation of western institutions’ (North, 
2005: 159).23 We should repeat that institutions are essentially solutions to cooperation dilemmas 
and that multiple institutional arrangements should emerge to support credible commitment in 
the transition to democracy and economic development. Interestingly, in the last years we have 
been witnessing a willingness to depart from orthodoxy, which suggests a break in development 
thinking (Rodrik, 2006). For example, building on the 2004 Barcelona Development Agenda and 
World Bank’s (2005) Economic Growth in the 1990s, the 2010 Human Development Report stressed 
the  context-specificity  of  institutional  reforms  and  the  diversity  of  development  pathways 
(UNDP, 2010).
  Recognizing the possibility of alternative development pathways does not mean 
[19]  This point is quite similar to the one made by Paul Collier (2008) in his book Wars, Guns & Votes
[20]  North’s concern about political stability is not new. In 1990, he warned that ‘when there is a radical change in 
the formal rules that makes them inconsistent with the existing informal constraints, there is an unresolved tension 
between them that will lead to long-run political instability’ (North, 1990: 140).
[21]  Remarkably, the 2010 Human Development Report draws some lessons from Polanyi. Yet Polanyi’s insights 
should be incorporated more systematically into development thinking and practices.
[22]  Other Latin American countries, including Ecuador, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Argentina (which also evolved 
from IMF’s poster child to basket case), have experienced relatively similar patterns. 
[23]  Quian (2003) and Rodrik (2010) provide good insights into China’s singular development path.
we could not draw lessons from successful and unsuccessful experiences. It simply means 
those lessons should be extracted from carefully designed political economy analyses aimed 
at identifying the political, institutional and social constraints on development. The challenge 
is to strike the balance between a naïve one-size-fits-all approach and a helpless everything-
depends-on-local-conditions one. In other words, we need to master the art of contingent 
generalizations. For example, Campos and Root’s (1996) work on East Asia still offers lessons 
regarding the importance of reconciling the politics of accumulation and redistribution. Similarly, 
Rodrik’s  (2003)  analytical  narratives  throw  light  on  the  interactions  between  governance, 
institutions and development. Some scholars have been even more ambitious. Bates et al. (2006) 
build on the experience of post-independence Latin America to inform Africa’s contemporary 
quandaries; Ravallion (2008) draw lessons for Africa from China’s successful poverty reduction 
strategy, even knowing the cases are hardly similar.24
5.5  Beliefs and Institutional Design
  Knack  (2003)  concludes  that  the  making  of  development  policy  should  be 
grounded in a thorough political economy analysis of the political, institutional and social 
bindings constraints on development. Following North, we can safely argue that, without an 
understanding of how conflicting beliefs limit the range of feasible options, this analysis is 
bound to fail. As Eggertsson (2005: 38-9) argues: ‘when our knowledge of social mechanisms is 
scarce, policymaking can become a walk in the dark’. The issue is not ‘wising-up’ elites, a point 
usually attributed to the late Mancur Olson. The real issue is having a proper understanding 
of the margins at which a given institutional structure, and its multiple components, can be 
changed. It is also about comprehending the cognitive roots of social conflict, political disorder 
and economic backwardness. The latter is crucial for identifying policy windows and estimating 
degrees of freedom in institutional reform. Without a deep understanding of the cultural heritage 
of a society and the structure of beliefs underlying a given institutional structure, we can hardly 
have good insights into possible reform, including its implications for political and social order. 
In North’s words:
‘In order to improve the institutional structure we must first have a clear understanding of the sources of such 
institutional structure…We must have not only a clear understanding of the belief structure underlying the 
existing institutions but also margins at which the belief structure may be amenable to changes that will make 
possible the implementation of more productive institutions’ (North, 2005: 163-4) 
5.6	 From	Institutional	Stability	to	Adaptive	Efficiency
  The dominant good governance discourse put the emphasis on the predictability 
and stability of the rules of the game. But the importance of adaptive efficiency and institutional 
adaptation is often unappreciated (Helpman, 2004). We should repeat that the key issue for 
developing countries is not lack of growth during good times, but the size of growth destruction 
during hard times. Poor countries stay poor because ‘they experience more frequent episodes of 
shrinking income and more negative growth during the episodes’ (North et al., 2009: 6). Stop-
and-go growth has been for example the Achilles’ heel of development in Latin America (North, 
2005). Smart institution building is about striking a balance between commitment and flexibility. 
Institutions have to be strong enough to induce innovation, investment and wealth creation, 
but flexible enough to accommodate negative shocks and unexpected events. The principle of 
[24]  Rodrik (2010) proposes a different model. Specifically, he claims that development economists should be ‘diag-
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adaptive efficiency, ‘an ongoing condition in which the society continues to modify or create 
new institutions as problems evolve’ (North, 2005: 169), should inform development strategies. 
We should understand that institutional stability sometimes involves a dose of institutional 
adaptation (Thelen, 2003).
5.7  The Unsolved Dilemmas of Institutional Conditionality
  One of the most contentious issues in development policy concerns the relationship 
between development assistance and institutional reform. Does the strategic manipulation of 
foreign aid foster or hinder the prospects of better governance in developing countries? Sorting 
out the so-called ‘aid-institutions paradox’ (Moss et al., 2006) lies beyond the scope of this 
paper. Yet some issues can be highlighted.  
  Seeking to improve societies through institution building is always challenging; it is 
even more challenging from a Northean perspective. In the short run, all we can do is to modify, 
and with limited degrees of freedom, the formal rules of the game. But this would hardly alter 
the real structure of incentives guiding choices, given the pervasiveness of informal constraints, 
enforcement  mechanisms,  and  mental  models.  In  this  context,  the  idea  of  making  the 
availability of foreign aid conditional on institutional performance, one of the main tenets of the 
good governance consensus, is highly problematic, if not controversial. In an influential paper, 
Alberto Alesina (1998: 217; emphasis added) made a bold case for ‘institutional conditionality’:
‘Given that foreign aid typically increases government consumption, the World Bank and other international 
organizations should consider withdrawing financial and technical assistance from countries that do not 
satisfy minimum standards of institutional quality. Cutting off assistance may increase growth and foster social 
development in the medium run by creating incentives for institutional development’.
  Alesina’s argument raises a number of issues. It is evident that aid creates perverse 
incentives, for both donors and recipient countries (Gibson et al., 2005), eventually removing 
incentives for institutional reform. Yet it is naïve to believe we can create incentives for institutional 
development simply by pulling the plug or threatening to do it (or by not giving aid in the first 
place). Playing moral hazard games with real countries is full of unintended consequences, 
mainly if the sequence of moves undermines political stability.25 But the most important issue, 
from a Northean perspective, is that we can hardly create incentives for institutional reform 
without having a thorough understanding of the interactions between the various components 
of countries’ institutional matrix. We also need to have a deep understanding of the possibilities 
and limits of institutional reform, including ways of overcoming ‘the determinacy paradox’ 
(Eggertsson, 2005). Without taking the politics of institutional change seriously, institutional 
conditionality is a gamble, occasionally a very expensive one. In the meantime, development 
policy attempts to square, not very successfully, the aspiration of using aid as an instrument for 
institution building and the idea of allocating aim conditional on institutional performance.
5.8  Natural States: A New Way of Thinking About Development?
  The policy implications of Violence and Social Orders do not sit well with the good 
governance discourse. As Menard and Shirley (2010: 22) explained, ‘aid interventions that try 
to embed elections, entry into markets, property rights, or other aspects of open access orders 
[25]  This was the case in Argentina in December 2001, when the international community decided to remove sup-
port in the worst moment, triggering political instability, a development disaster and, crucially, a systematic process 
of governance regress.
and that try to eliminate rent seeking…can destabilize elite agreements and unleash violence 
and disorder’. North, Wallis and Weingast conclude, controversially, that the main insight of 
their work is that ‘natural states are not sick’: ‘natural states have their own logic; they are 
not dysfunctional’ (North et al., 2009: 269). They also denounce that most development advice 
attempts, with little effect, to induce a transition towards open access societies. This strategy 
embedded in the good governance framework can be self-defeating, mainly when it undermines 
the conditions supporting political and social order. These scholars suggest a new way of 
thinking about both economic and political development. Developing policy, they contend, 
should promote development within the logic of natural states (unless the country has already 
met the doorstep conditions), focusing on building state capacity, increasing impersonality, and 
controlling the dispersion and use of violence.26 
5.9  Rediscovering Institutional Policy
  Institutional policy is the weakest link of new institutional economics (Eggertsson, 
2005).  It  is  the  weakest  link  of  the  good  governance  approach  as  well.  Paradoxically,  a 
development  agenda  that  emphasizes  the  causal  role  of  institutions  tends  to  overlook 
institutional reform. As Dani Kaufmann and his colleagues critically observed: 
‘In spite of the growing consensus among policy analysts, civil society groups, aid donors and scholars, that 
good governance matters for sustained growth and development, implementing concerted efforts to improve 
governance and fight corruption often do not get priority in industrialized and emerging economies’ (Kaufmann 
et al., 2009b: 1, emphasis added).
  Existing research showing that governance matters for development ‘does not 
often point the way towards specific reforms, because it is based largely on very broad and 
aggregated indicators of institutional performance’ (Knack, 2003: 294). In this context, drawing 
policy lessons from empirical studies on institutions is not always straightforward. For example, 
Feng (2003: 37) concludes that ‘a nation can achieve “economic miracles” by reducing political 
instability, building policy certainty, and increasing political freedom’. So what? The problem is 
that most empirical studies on the effects of institutions are too general (and sometimes too 
naïve) and therefore unable to provide lessons for institutional design.27 As Rodrik (2003: 8) put 
it:
‘Once one moves beyond general statements that property rights are good for growth and corruption is bad, 
there is much that remains unclear. Which institutions demand priority? What are the specific institutional 
reforms that are required? Do these differ across countries according to the level of development, historical 
trajectory, and initial conditions?’ 
  Let’s finish this section by stating clearly what an institutionalist approach to 
development policy should be about. There are two competing thesis regarding the influence 
of institutions on development. On the one hand, some scholars have an optimistic but naïve 
understanding of the role of institutions.  We can improve societies by simply setting the right 
incentives through institutional reform. On the other hand, some scholars believe that there 
is no institutional fix to politics. Institutions are epiphenomenal and redundant; they simply 
reflect underlying political equilibria. In my opinion, these extreme positions are both wrong. 
[26]  Despite its inconvenient implications, these ideas are already attracting the attention of the development 
community. According to Menard and Shirley (2010: 23), the World Bank and some development agencies, including 
France’s Development Agency (AfD), have been commissioning case studies based on Violence and Social Orders’ 
analytical framework.
[27]  Methodological issues, including the practice of measuring institutions through outcomes and the problem of 
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Institutions do have a systematic effect on outcomes; yet, the relationship between institutions 
and outcomes is messy and full of unintended consequences. An institutionalist-minded 
reformer should show that a specific institutional innovation would improve outcomes ceteris 
paribus. Institutional change should induce a positive behavioral change given the prevailing 
structure of interests, informal constraints, and beliefs. This assumes a profound knowledge of 
the politics of institutional change, including the conditions under which institutions emerge 
and evolve in equilibrium. As Greif (2006) argued:
‘Whether a society’s institutions achieve socially good or bad outcomes, they cannot be studied independently 
from the broader society of which they are an integral part’
6.  ConClusIon: stIll A proGressIve reseArCh proGrAm?
‘Doug’s deepest contribution as an economist has been his powerful intuition about what questions we should 
be asking next’ (Wallis, 2010: 3)
‘A second curious feature is the apparently cyclical nature of the research in development. Each generation 
of work is a self-conscious reaction to past thinking, and is superseded in turn by a similar reaction to itself’ 
(Rodrik, 2010: 34)  
  Douglass North is deservedly a towering figure in the social sciences. Among other 
contributions, he has played a leading role in the rise of new institutional economics and the 
renaissance  of  political  economy.  By  asking  timely  and  sometimes  inconvenient  questions 
about the institutional conditions of prosperity, he has also made a massive contribution to 
development studies. North’s research program has been to a large extent successful. Building 
on his insights, we can now tell a better story about the sources and dynamics of economic and 
political development that we would do otherwise. However, despite its obvious merits, the 
institutional analysis of development still faces serious analytical and policy gaps. Moreover, 
both academic and policy studies on the institutional foundations of development are still 
overlooking, if not blatantly ignoring, some of North’s main lessons. In this conclusion, I shall 
outline the key arguments of this article and reflect upon the future of the research program on 
institutions and development. 
  The central claim of this article is that the Northean approach is about institutions 
and property rights, but not only about institutions and property rights. Since his 1981 book, 
North has consistently underscored the cognitive and political underpinnings of both economic 
and institutional change. Without recognizing that the processes of economic and institutional 
development are intensely political,28 it would be impossible to make progress in understanding 
how pervasive informal constraints and imperfect enforcement interact with formal institutions 
in defining society’s incentive structure. Similarly, it would be impossible to make sense of the 
political and ideological patterns explaining the stickiness of inefficient institutions.29 North 
has been also advocating a move beyond property rights, stressing the possibility of alternative 
institutional paths and emphasizing the issue of adaptive efficiency.  Many of these issues 
cannot be easily accommodated within the prevailing governance-matters discourse. Instead 
of cherry picking, and eventually distorting his ideas, the development community should take 
more seriously the implications of North’s writings, including his latest research on beliefs 
systems and social orders.    
  In order to remain a progressive research program, the ‘institutions rule’ paradigm 
should also address anomalies and respond to critiques. The conceptual and empirical issues 
raised by Glaeser et al. (2004), Przeworski (2004) and Sangpman (2007) are too serious to be 
ignored. Moreover, prominent neo-institutionalist scholars seem to share some of their concerns. 
Take one of the most contentious issues, the measurement of institutions. John Wallis, one 
of North’s closest colleagues, has recently warned that ‘what passes for institutions in much 
of the economics literature, however, are really outcomes, not institutions. Secure property 
rights,  governments  that  make  credible  commitments,  rule  of  law,  impersonal  exchange, 
[28]  North is not alone claiming that politics should be brought back into the study of development. See, e.g., Left-
wich (2000), Bates (2001) and Bardhan (2005). Even Kaufmann (2003: 27), from the World Bank Institute, claimed 
that ‘one of the most difficult issues in the field of governance is the imperfect understanding of how politics shapes 
governance and developmental outcomes’.
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and  trust  are  real  phenomenon. However,  they  are the result  of institutions,  they  are  not 
themselves institutions’ (Wallis, 2010: 14). Or take the primacy-of-institutions thesis. Wallis also 
recognizes that ‘the dynamics of social interactions –political, economic, religious, military, and 
educational- determine which changes are rejected, which are sustained, and which changes 
persist to have a large impact’ (Wallis, 2010: 20).30 Wallis’ comments are totally consistent with 
the main messages of this article: further research on institutions and development should 
address issues of concept formation and measurement, overcome conceptual stretching, and 
reconcile theories of institutional effects and endogenous institutions.
  The literature should not only accommodate anomalies, but also pay attention 
to new issues. What questions should we be asking next? First, we should be asking original 
questions about beliefs. We cannot make sense of economic and institutional change without 
understanding how people in different societies interpret their environment and solve the 
problems they confront. Without understanding the implications of belief systems, institutional 
policy remains a walk in the dark. In this context, as North forcefully argued in Understanding the 
Process of Economic Change, we should systematically study the complex interaction between 
events, belief formation and institutions. This research should focus on assessing how beliefs 
constrain the choice set of the actors, defining the range of perceived legitimate change and 
the scope for institutional reform. This research effort should cut across the boundaries of 
economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, and cognitive science. Despite North’s 
constant cries, this research program is still wanting.31 
  Second, if we trust North’s intuition, we should also be asking bold questions 
about conflict. Violence and Social Orders is actually part of a new generation of research raising 
provoking questions about the linkages between political regimes, economic development and 
violence (Bates, 2008; Collier, 2009). Much of the most exciting political economy research in 
the last decade has been devoted to disentangling the sources and implications of conflict, 
including the interactions between ethnicity, natural resources, governance, and development.32 
There is also a growing literature assessing the dynamics of governance and development in 
fragile states.33 This research interest is based on the increasing awareness of the inadequacy of 
understanding the governance and development profiles of countries such as Congo, Zimbabwe, 
Ivory Coast, Haiti, Bolivia, Nicaragua, or Venezuela without reference to their deeply rooted 
political struggles. The 2011 World Development Report, which precisely focuses on conflict and 
development, epitomizes this important shift in development thinking (World Bank, 2011). 
  Third, there is also a renewed interest, in both academic and policy circles, in the 
political economy of redistribution (World Bank, 2006; Robinson, 2010). The recent focus on the 
economic and governance implications of inequality has been driven by empirical and academic 
developments. On the empirical side, the gap in well being between rich and poor countries is 
still obscenely high. In addition, despite improvements in some aspects of human development, 
[30]  Menard and Shirley (2010) also provide a powerful internal critique of the remaining challenges of the institu-
tional analysis of development. Tellingly, these authors also point out systematic problems in the conceptualization 
and measurement of institutions and the modeling of institutional effects.
[31]  For some useful insights into the interactions between beliefs and institutions, see Grief (2006).
[32]  Research on these issues has literally exploded in the last decade. See, e.g., Fearon and Laitin (2003), Hoeffler 
and Collier (2004), Fearon (2005), Kalyvas (2006), and Besley and Kudamatsu (2007).
[33]  See, e.g., Francois and Sud (2006) and Collier (2008).
including poverty reduction, education, and health, the extent of income inequality within 
countries remains a major concern.34 On the academic side, scholars have been documenting the 
hindering effects of inequality on institutional and economic development (Chong and Kradstein, 
2007) and stressing that pervasive distributive conflicts are behind the stickiness of inefficient 
institutions (Bardhan, 2005). In this context, the shift in emphasis from poverty reduction to 
equity, and from pro-poor growth to inclusive and shared growth, is not very surprising and 
certainly welcome.
  Fourth,  we  should  stimulate  research  about  the  international  dimension  of 
development. Global governance, domestic institutions and economic development are 
inevitably linked (Rodrik, 2008, 2011). Developing countries are embedded in a global system of 
power and economic relations, which shapes the contours of both economic and institutional 
change. Robert Bates (2008) showed that state failure and the breakdown of political violence 
in Africa have been rooted in self-defeating domestic policy choices and local elites’ predatory 
behavior. But he also showed that changes in the international environment have crucially 
affected domestic elites’ structure of incentives. Governments’ capacity to accommodate 
negative external shocks in the context of latent social conflict is one of the key challenges of 
economic development (Rodrik, 1999). Governance issues should be studied in a global context. 
Corruption, for instance, is not exclusively a ‘domestic’ issue; corruption opportunities are also 
rooted in the working of the global economic system, including the behavior of transnational 
companies. Finally, a new body of research suggests that the marriage between democracy, 
economic growth and social progress would not be achieved in the absence of facilitating external 
conditions, or even intense international interventions (e.g. Collier, 2009). The development 
community should not neglect the challenging implications of this literature.
   As Dani Rodrik recently highlighted, development thinking tends to exhibit a cyclical 
nature, as the profession seeks to learn from previous policy failures and accommodate emerging 
issues. It remains to be seen whether a new focus on beliefs, informal politics, distributive 
conflicts, endogenous institutions, and context can be successfully accommodated within the 
dominant governance paradigm, or whether this new research agenda would eventually lead to 
a post-institutionalist consensus. The content of the new agenda may suggest the latter, but one 
may expect, using one of North’s favourite concepts, an element of path dependence, pointing 
to a new generation of governance discourse (an improved governance agenda). After all, the 
creation and circulation of ideas in development research is not always guided by evidence and 
findings; it is also shaped by vested interests, intellectual fads, ideological considerations, and 
geopolitical realignments.
[34]  According to the 2010 Human Development Report, ‘since the 1980s, income inequality has risen in many more 
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